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Abstract
Systemic risks characterizing the Russian overnight interbank market from the net-
work point of view are analyzed.
Introduction
The continuing financial crisis has focused particular attention to systemic risks related
to interbank network. The corresponding literature includes papers analyzing real interbank
networks [1–3], theoretical discussions and modelling [4, 5] and discussion of prudential
measures [6]. At the conceptual level the research in this area is based on a theory of complex
networks, see e.g. [7–9].
The main goal of the present study is to examine the structure of the Russian interbank
network and the corresponding systemic risks related to possible default of one of the banks
and the volume of contagion triggered by this event.
In our analysis we use the data on overnight interbank transactions of 767 banks from
August 1 2011 till November 3 2011. The choice was made in such a way that each bank had
at least one transaction within the considered time period. Only transactions corresponding
to borrowing (lending) money without any collateral were taken into account.
Network structure
Let us turn to a more detailed description of the global properties of the Russian interbank
networks. As has been already mentioned, the database includes all 767 banks having at least
one transaction within the considered period of 69 days.
The network of interbank interactions is defined as follows. The nodes of a network
stand for banks. A (directed) link between two nodes describes an interbank interaction
involving two parties, a borrower and a lender. In what follows we use a standard definition
where the link is directed from a borrower to a lender. In network terms lending money to a
counterparty creates an outgoing link and borrowing money - an incoming one. In addition,
each link is characterized by the amount of money borrowed (lent). An interbank network is
thus fully characterized by a directed weighted graph GW = (N,W ), where N is the number
of the nodes and W = {wi j} is an N ×N matrix of interbank exposures where wi j > 0 is a
total obligation of the bank i to the bank j.
Let first analyze the gross geometrical features of the interbank network under consider-
ation.
The simplest characteristics of a network is a probability p of having a link which, for a
network with N vertices and K links can be estimated as
p =
2K
N(N −1)
(1)
For the Russian interbank network under consideration the average value of p is 〈p〉 ∼
0.0037.
Another important characteristics of a graph is a clustering coefficient C1 which can
conveniently be defined as a ratio of a number of actually existing links between the z nearest
neighbors of a vertex and their total possible number z(z−1)/2. It is clear that for a totally
random graph one has C = p. For the network under consideration the averaged clustering
coefficients for incoming and outgoing clusters CIn = 0.035 and COut = 0.012 respectively
showing a significant amount of clustering.
Let us now turn to the global characteristics of the trading pattern corresponding to a
characteristic interbank network. The simplest characteristics of an overall activity is the
mean number of banks that are active or, equivalently, the mean number of banks that are
passive on a given day. The corresponding values are 470 and 297 respectively, so that on a
typical day we have a network of 470 active banks. These latter can be active in a different
fashion. At two opposite poles are pure lenders, i.e. vertices with incoming links only - on
average, 299 vertices per day and pure borrowers, i.e. vertices with outgoing links only - on
average, 92 vertices. The remaining 79 vertices serve as connectors between borrowers and
lenders, i.e. borrow and lend at the same time. A more detailed description of an average
daily ”in-out” pattern is presented in the Table 1. The columns in Table 1 correspond to
Table 1: Interbank market structure
Condition k = 0 k > 0 k > 2 k > 10
In 389 (14) 378 (14) 126 (9) 14 (3)
Out 596 (8) 171 (8) 82 (5) 29 (3)
Only In 297 (15) 299 (14) 82 (8) 2 (1)
Only Out 297 (15) 92 (8) 29 (4) 5 (2)
an average daily number of vertices of given type (In, Out, etc.) satisfying some certain
condition. In parentheses we show the corresponding standard deviations.
As has been already mentioned, the systemic risk associated with an interbank network
refers to propagation of defaults triggered by the default of one or several banks (vertices)
and propagating along outgoing links. In this context the properties of the Russian interbank
market characterized by the Table 1 lead us to the following observations:
1. The number of pure lenders is almost twice as large as that of pure borrowers. This
feature creates specific systemic risks because a default of any borrower may lead to
defaults of several lenders.
2. Of special interest are those 29 banks which are characterized by large (kout > 10)
values of their out-degree. These banks are clearly especially important sources of
systemic risk. Let us note that these banks accumulate 63% of the total systemic debt.
1For simplicity in computing C we treat the graph as an undirected one.
3. Let us also point at those 14 banks that have more than 10 incoming links. From the
network perspective these banks play a role of hubs absorbing potential shocks due to
their loan’s diversification. These banks control 37% of the total loan.
An important generic feature of a directed network are the probability distributions
P(k in) and P(kout) for the number of incoming and outgoing links for a vertex. The ma-
jority of networks discussed in the literature, see e.g. [7–9], are the so-called scale-free ones,
i.e. have powerlike tails P(k) ∼ const/kγ . The corresponding marginal in- and out- degree
distributions for the Russian interbank market are shown in Figs. 1 and 2 respectively. We
see that the network is scale-free for both distributions with γ in = 1.92 and γout = 2.64.
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Figure 1: Marginal in- degree distribution.
Propagation of contagion in a network is crucially dependent on its connectivity. The
simplest corresponding characteristics is an average number of in- and out- links z in2 and
z out2 of the nearest neighbors of a vertex. The bigger are z in2 and z out2 in comparison with
the mean number of in- and out- links for a vertex z1 = z in1 = z out1 , the easier is contagion
propagation along the corresponding cluster. For the Russian interbank network we have
z1 = 1.41, z in2 = 9 and z out2 = 28. This the condition z2/z1 > 2 for an existence of a giant
component holds both for in- and out- clusters.
A more detailed information on the network connectivity is given by a conditional prob-
ability distribution P
(
k in2 ,k out2 |k in1 ,k out1
)
characterizing probability for a nearest neighbor of
a vertex with k in1 incoming and k out1 outgoing to have k in2 and k out2 incoming and outgoing
links respectively. In Fig. 3 we show two lowest moments of its marginal distributions,
namely 〈k out2 〉(k out1 ), Fig. 3 (a), and 〈k in2 〉(k out1 ), Fig. 3 (b). Both plots show pronounced
assortiativity at small k out1 for both k in2 and k out2 .
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Figure 2: Marginal out- degree distributions.
Contagion effect
Let us start with formulating the model of default contagion spreading in a bank network
we are using in the present study. The original source of risk are banks (vertices) that have
loans and default on their payment. The banks immediately affected by such a default are
the nearest neighbors of this vertex reachable via outgoing links attached to it. If one of the
nearest neighbors also defaults, the process can spread further. A probability of infection
depends on the number of incoming and outgoing links of a vertex. In the present study we
use a simple stylized model of bank balance sheets from [5]. However, at difference with the
analysis of [5] and similarly to [3], we are working with the real day-by-day topologies of
the interbank market. In this model a representative bank has a simple balance sheet struc-
ture with interbank and illiquid assets on the assets side and capital, deposits and interbank
obligations on the liabilities side shown in Fig. 4. The corresponding condition for the bank
i to be solvent is
(1−φ)AIBi +qAMi −LIBi −Di > 0, (2)
where AIBi denotes interbank assets of bank i, AMi – its illiquid assets, LIBi – its interbank lia-
bilities, φ is a fraction of banks having obligations with respect to bank i that have defaulted,
and q is the discount for fire-selling illiquid assets. It is assumed that interbank claims and
liabilities of a particular bank are uniformly distributed across its borrowers and creditors so
that φ = 1ji where ji is the number of borrowers. This assumption highlights an importance
of the incoming degree for each bank as reflecting its risk diversification. Banks with a high
value of the incoming degree have lower probability to go bankrupt due to contagion effect.
At the same time banks with a high value of the outgoing degree can be the sources of con-
tagion. For simplicity neglect the fire discount, i.e. assume q = 1 in Eq. 2. Therefore one
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Figure 3: Out-in (a) and out-out (b) degree correlations
Figure 4: Simplified balance sheet
can rewrite the solvency condition 2 as follows:
Ki
AIBi
>
1
ji , (3)
where the capital buffer Ki is defined as
Ki = AIBi +qAMi −LIBi −Di (4)
Our main goal will be to study the impact of the capital buffer size on the number of
banks which default due to contagion. The procedure we use is as follows:
1. We set the values of relevant parameters. We assume that AIBi makes 20% of the
balance sheet and study a range of capital buffer values from 4 to 10 % of the balance
sheet.
2. Taking real structure of the overnight interbank market we default each bank and de-
termine the size of the default cluster by checking, using Eq. 3, whether some of its
nearest neighbors that can be reached from the defaulted vertex via outgoing links
are infected, etc. For each initial bank i a default cluster for is the number of banks
defaulted due to the default of i as a result of contagion process.
3. Finally, for each value of the capital buffer we calculate an average over default cluster.
The results of this simulation are presented in Figs. 5 and 6 in which probability dsitri-
bution of default cluster sizes (Fig. 5) and a dependence of the average default cluster on
the value of capital buffer (Fig. 6) are shown. From the distribution in Fig. 5 we can make
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Figure 5: Probability distribution for cluster size,
capital buffer 4%.
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Figure 6: Average size of default cluster as a
function of a capital buffer.
quantitative statements on the significance of systemic network-related risks. For example,
for the capital buffer size of 4% of total balance sheet there is a 1% probability for more than
8 banks go bankrupt. The main conclusion that can be drawn from Fig. 6 is that the average
default cluster size is rapidly decaying with growing capital buffer.
Conclusion
In this study we have analyzed some systemic network-related properties of the Russian
overnight interbank market. A detailed analysis will be published in [10].
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